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Abstract Working households have never owned so much, but the value of their
property—especially in the wake of the recent economic crisis, which has priced
people out of their homes and devalued their pension savings—is unstable. Liberal
economic thought promotes private property as a self-evident vehicle of investment
for the future. In contrast, anthropology highlights the social foundations of prop-
erty, while value theory foregrounds the exigencies of accumulation. Drawing on
the latters’ sensitivities and on my fieldwork in Israel on property divisions upon
divorce, I examine contested meanings and uses of household property to argue that
financialization, a new regime of accumulation that places property values in flux,
amplifies tensions in economic liberalism, thereby exposing its ideological
underpinnings.
Keywords Financialization  Security  Investment  Economic liberalism 
Divorce  Israel
In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty (2014) discusses the
inequality brought about by the rate of return on property exceeding that of work.1
His most memorable examples of property’s significance come from nineteenth-
century novels. He makes sense of Jane Austen’s preoccupation with marriage by
demonstrating the extent to which the fortunes of her characters relied on the
property they married into or inherited. At the time, patrimony dwarfed anything
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one could earn by working. Piketty cautions that since property-generated income
nowadays again outperforms work earnings, we are witnessing an analogous
accumulation of wealth among those with property and dispossession among those
without. He does point to one significant difference between then and now. Absent
inflation, property once appealed to its owners as a dependable repository of value,
hence a good investment for the future. Present-day property is dynamic and
volatile, with piles of banknotes apt to melt before one’s eyes unless well managed
(Piketty 2014: 453–455). Piketty nevertheless recommends taxing property as an
antidote to inequality, assuming that property would remain pervasive enough to
render its taxation meaningful.
It’s an odd assumption, seeing as property whose value fluctuates unpredictably
offers its owners little in the way of security. With the havoc that global finance
wreaks to property values, the persistent veneration of property seems incongruous.
Is there something deceptive about the value of property? The question calls to mind
James Ferguson’s (1985) account of the Bovine Mystique. In rural Lesotho, men
buy property in the form of livestock to preserve a portion of their work earnings for
the future. Women hate this because they need a steady cash flow to run their
households. Yet the senior generation relies on calves as installments toward the
lifelong bride-wealth owed them. Having everything to gain from the value of
livestock overriding the importance of household upkeep, seniors protect this value
through myths and injunctions. Without such mystique, Ferguson argues, this
property would at least be contested.
In rich countries, household property, that is, durable future-oriented private
property of the kind that households usually seek and whose possession is meant to
satisfy needs that exceed immediate consumption, transcends livestock to include
such tangible and intangible assets as homes, cars, bank savings and other long-term
investments, pension accounts, insurance policies, degrees and credentials, mutual
funds, stocks and bonds. But are they not similarly mystifying? Working households
have never owned so much, yet the value of household property—especially in the
wake of the recent economic crisis, which has priced people out of their homes and
devalued their pension savings—is unstable. Property is nevertheless widely
represented as a self-evident investment for the future, calling forth sacrifices in the
present. My goal in this article is to draw out some of the ideological underpinnings
of property as they strain to withstand countervailing pressures, amplified in recent
decades by financialization: the imposition of a deregulated global financial market
into household economics.
Ethnographic strategies
Property is receiving fresh scholarly attention with its current proliferation and
transformation. The kind of property scrutinized most closely is small-scale
household property, which signifies the universal liberty of private possession as a
government-guaranteed right. Macpherson (1962) called ‘‘possessive individual-
ism’’ the idea that man is free by virtue of sole proprietorship of his person and that
society is a set of relations between proprietors. He traced its moral force to
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conditions that pertained in early capitalist societies, and identified pressures it has
come under once non- or smaller proprietors with little to gain from venerating
private ownership attained political power.
Anthropologists have challenged the liberal idea of private ownership from a
different direction. Looking at societies that don’t relate to the things that surround
them in the way that Western legal thought presupposes, they questioned the self-
evidence of proprietary aims (Riles 2004). Chris Hann (2015) argued nevertheless
for the usefulness of the category, provided that it’s deployed with a mind to the
specific relations and powers that infuse it with meaning. Some anthropologists have
directed their gaze to the postsocialist world, where property has taken on different
meanings as society transformed. Fehervary (2013) demonstrated how the
curtailment of other forms of property in state-socialist Hungary elevated homes
as repositories of family wealth and symbols of elusive normality. Hann (1993)
showed how Hungary’s extension of property rights in land, far from encouraging
investments, has led to outcomes overdetermined by family and political pressures.
And Verdery (2004) revealed how newly privatized lands in Transylvania turned
into liabilities and status symbols. An ethnographic approach, she argued, is the
only way to make sense of property that is at once a cultural system, an organization
of power and a social relation (2003: 48).
But ethnography on its own does not always suffice to challenge the enduring
liberal legacy of property. In her ethnographic study of property confiscations for
redevelopment in Philadelphia, Debbie Becher (2014) found property to operate as
an investment vehicle. She saw it reflecting John Locke’s defense of property as a
way to preserve the benefits deriving from an individual’s labor. Granting
anthropologists’ caveat that property means different things to different people,
the idea of property as a vehicle for investment implies only that people expect the
expenditures they make and store in property to be preserved in it.
By considering property an investment vehicle, Becher endowed ethnographic
breadth to an unwavering understanding of property from classic liberalism of the
seventeenth century. But does it still make sense? Investment is a sacrifice in the
immediate or protracted present of some measure of work, time, money or
emotions, which through the vehicle of property are projected onto a future when
their equivalents can be retrieved. Unlike speculation whose outcomes are
unpredictable and immediate, investments are oriented toward foreseeable long-
term aims. Durable property is a fitting repository for investments insofar as it
appears to retain the value equivalents of what its owners have put into it. To
function in this way, however, property must be anchored in a stable economic and
social system that allows it to be converted at will to its investment equivalents. The
problem is that nowadays, property values as much as the market dynamics they’re
linked to are too volatile for investments to yield predictable outcomes or remain
perpetually convertible. What is more, financial instruments, like credit cards,
student loans, mortgages, deductions and installments, collapse the temporalities of
investment and outcome, making it possible to enjoy property now while paying for
it in the future or pay piecemeal for something only partly owned or possibly never
attained.
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I’d like to offer in this article a corrective to the kind of ethnographic approach
that takes at face value public and private pronouncements, issuing from economic
liberalism, about property as an investment vehicle. I propose an alternative
approach informed by the theoretical sensitivities of value theory. Anthropologists
who have worked in this tradition (e.g. Eiss and Pedersen 2002; Munn 1986; Turner
1979, 2003, 2008) have effectively borrowed from Karl Marx’s analysis of the
capitalist system of value production attentiveness to broader social, economic and
political preconditions and implications of what their subjects found meaningful.
They have thereby positioned individual deliberate action as a formative node in,
and mediator of, material processes and class struggles. The proclivity of such
theorists to generalize their findings to many different kinds of populations creates a
need to anchor them when studying the specificities of capitalist society. Elsewhere
(Weiss 2015) I have drawn on Moishe Postone (1993) to nuance anthropological
value theory in an interrogation of moral values. Here, I’d like to use David Harvey
in the same way to offer a counterattack on economic liberalism through
ethnographic interrogation of household property.
In his critique of Piketty’s book, Harvey (2014) explains that its limitations—for
example pointing out higher returns on property compared to those on work without
explaining them, as well as identifying the volatility of property values but
dismissing them in policy recommendations—stem from a static understanding of
property as an object of un-interrogated value. They could be overcome, Harvey
suggests, if Piketty were to consider wealth inequalities from the standpoint the
process of accumulation. Higher returns on property could then be explained in
terms of the power of capital over the labor it exploits it in the production of value.
Its volatility, in turn, could be grasped through an understanding of how
overproduction, which gives rise to the need to absorb the surplus produced and
invest it profitably, generates such pressures on accumulation that could only be
resolved through flexible adjustment of the values of the commodities produced to
its changing exigencies.
Value theory is of special significance when confronting a liberal notion of
property as an investment vehicle, whose viability hinges on the value of the
property invested in. Following this logic of inquiry, I suggest that household
property be approached in two, complimentary ways. First, by observing
ethnographically and analyzing contextually the meanings that households attribute
to it vis-a`-vis those that reign in the public and legal spheres. And second, by
observing property through the lens of social and economic processes like
financialization, which influence its value in the service of accumulation. The liberal
promotion of property as an incentive for investment, and by extension a motor of
economic growth and general well-being, is far less compelling in the present
moment when people seek property to buffer the insecurities generated by market
turbulence and the withdrawal of public safety nets. Examining how household
property is treated both legally and practically at this point in time offers a way of
unveiling some of the ideological underpinnings of economic liberalism.
The challenge of observing ethnographically something like household property
is that people normally accumulate it in a scattered way over entire lifetimes. They
invest in educational or professional credentials here, buy a car or take a mortgage
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on a home there, run a small business, deduct portions of their earnings for
retirement or manage a variety of debts and assets in short- or long-term credit bills
or savings accounts, without ever taking stock of the total value of their property or
its significance. Unless, that is, they divorce. The legal necessity to divide property
upon divorce, including property that’s not physically divisible like a home or an
insurance policy, demands careful calculation of the monetary value of all
household property as a lump sum. This calculation occurs, moreover, in the throes
of economic setback. Marriage has been modeled as a pooling of resources,
including the differentiation and specialization of household work (Becker 1993). If
this pooling is a bulwark against an uncertain future, in divorce each spouse seeks—
through property or other means—to compensate for the expensive and time-
consuming un-pooling and evaluate what he or she has left to live on.
I look to divorce, then, for insight into household property, drawing on my
fieldwork in Israel. I interviewed thirty recently divorced men and women and
fourteen divorce experts including lawyers, mediators, judges and accountants. I
also sampled recent court decisions from divorce proceedings involving property
settlements, triangulating them with legal discourse on property division and with
scholarship on property and value theory. To grasp the present-day viability of
property ownership and investment, I had to bracket many specificities of divorce in
Israel including its implication in religious law and the social positioning of
divorcing couples. Sacrificing thick ethnographic detail in favor of a generalizable
argument, my discussion of Israel is limited to its being a financialized society
where liberal ideas on property rein, and my sole criterion in choosing which cases
to look at is that the divorcing spouses owned and divided property.
I follow in the footsteps of Viviana Zelizer (2005), who studied divorce cases for
the ways in which they interpolate intimacy with economic transaction. She avoided
engaging with issues like the value of the property whose divisions courts
sanctioned, in order to make an original argument about the complexity of intimate
relationships. Using a similar approach from the opposite tack, I grant the
complexity of intimate relationships and resist engaging with them in order to
interrogate the nature of the property in which they are entangled. Yet I part ways
with Zelizer in conducting an ethnographic study, which attends not merely to
juridical and scholarly representations but also to practices and preferences. I do so
to discern whether divorcing couples, their positioning and relationships notwith-
standing, are contesting in practice the value that liberal ideology attributes to
property.
In what follows I show, first, how legal proceedings, guided by a liberal notion of
property as an investment vehicle, strain to reconcile the incongruities brought
about by its unreliable value. Next, I show how divorcees are far less concerned
about either ownership or investment value than they are about the security they
hope to restore. Finally, I contextualize these findings in the imperatives of
financialization to highlight the challenges they pose to the liberal ideology that
perceives private ownership as a pathway to prosperity.
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Legal strategies
Upon divorcing, a woman sued her husband of 20 years for half the value of his
business. As in most liberal democracies, Israeli divorce law upholds an equal division
of marital property, including a business, a pension or anything else that either spouse
might own under his or her own name. This reflects the principle of marriage being a
sharing partnership, even as each spouse contributes to it differently, for example by
one being a breadwinner and the other a homemaker (Dagan 2003; Lifshitz 2009).
Exceptions include premarital property and property gifted solely to one spouse,
which are generally exempt from division. Here, the husband claimed such exemption
because he received the business from his father. The court rejected his claim, arguing
that what he received was reputation and clientele, using them to facilitate his
subsequent investments. It was the investment-driven appreciation of the business that
the court considered the real property. Having occurred while he was married, its value
would be divided equally (FC (Jer) 6980/08).
I begin with this simple ruling to show how property is treated in jurisprudence:
not as any given thing, but rather as a vehicle of investment. John Locke ([1689]
2003) offered an early formulation in his theory of property being the mixing of a
thing with one’s work, justifying people’s rights to the fruits of their labor. The
operative understanding is that regardless of the nature of their work, people place
some of its earnings into property in the expectation that it preserve their value over
time. In that light, James Woodburn (1982) held that unlike some hunter-gatherer
societies whose members obtain immediate returns from work, societies like ours
are delayed-return systems regulated through property. Property represents future
returns on work applied over time, or is held and managed in a way that has similar
implications.
Liberal economic thought is an assortment of different strands that interweave in
extolling the virtues, for society and its members, of private property. I can only
offer a parsimonious version of one of its main tenants here. Namely, that people are
likely to invest more and better when they believe in forthcoming returns on their
investments, and that property is therefore an incentive for productive investment by
all members of society, which makes the economy grow. It supports and is
supported by another strand of liberal thought: that the fruits of this economic
productivity are available to all those contributing to it (Rose 1994). Viewed in this
light, a mainstay of economic liberalism is that the institution of private property
makes us collectively wealthier.
Tensions appear in the liberal conception of property when someone’s
investments cannot be recouped from it. Consider the following: a 10-year marriage
had dissolved, leaving the wife nothing of her husband’s stocks in his family’s
business, which had been gifted to him personally. She demanded half the
appreciation value of her husband’s stocks accrued during marriage. The judges
ruled against her, reasoning that the stocks’ appreciation had nothing to do with any
investment on the husband’s behalf. But then they hesitated, acknowledging that she
had slowed down her career to raise the children. Upon divorce, she would remain
with the same income, while he would have ‘‘a stable, steady, and high-earning job,
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as if a decade of shared life together had no economic consequence for her’’ (CA
(TA) 1279/07: 25–26). The judges ordered, therefore, that other marital property be
divided in her favor.
Value theory alerts us to tensions and contradictions that, per Harvey (2006), are
inevitable in the process of accumulation insofar as exchange values have to be
realized as use values. Differently put, investments can only remain viable if
people’s needs and desires are synchronized thereby with the requirements of
profitability. But in system in which commodities congeal producers’ unremuner-
ated investments, there will always be a variance between them. Keeping sight of
this variance, it behooves us as critical anthropologists to uncover and account for
instances when the pull of unmet needs gives rise to contradictions in the
application of market-affirming liberal jurisprudence. In the matter at hand, judges
use the discretion legally afforded them to compensate one spouse for the other’s
enhanced earning capacity. Knowing that women generally fare worse than men
after divorce, they fear that an equal division of property might nevertheless skew
the fortunes of divorcing spouses. Israeli divorce law makes property the only
means to balance spousal resources, leaving work earnings untouched.2 Just as
private ownership is meant to encourage self-reliance, its division is designed to
enable a clean break that allows spouses to get on with their separate lives. Indeed,
when property is conceived of as representing spouses’ prior investments, its
follows that they’d each be entitled to the share of the property that represents this
investment. But judges are pressed to correct for incongruous outcomes that this
conception of property gives rise to, a pressure that ultimately stems from the
extraneous and unacknowledged investment-promoting demands of accumulation.
With the entire weight of postmarriage fortunes resting on property, its value cannot
easily be suppressed. An accountant told me about his most recent clients, whose story
conveys the tensions that value generates. They had each been doing well career-wise
when they wed, yet over the course of their 7-year marriage, the wife moderated her
career to be home with the children by 4 pm, while the husband was promoted to
partner at his firm, increasing his earnings by fivefold. She couldn’t claim half the
value of his saved earnings upon divorce because her husband was forty when they
wed, with most of the investments that had singled him out for promotion behind him.
Still, she would get something, the accountant said, ‘‘because they’re each others’
stock. He has to pay for his picture perfect home and for someday celebrating the
graduation of his wonderful children that his wife raised and educated.’’ The
accountant would calculate the ex-husband’s income appreciation and deduct from it a
risk-premium that reflects the uncertainties of marital stock: just as the husbands’
earnings might cease for a host of reasons, so the children might not grow up as
expected. A combination of probability estimates and negotiation would culminate in
a sum that would allow ‘‘him to redeem himself and her to live in dignity.’’
The accountant’s stock metaphor aggravates the expectation that property
preserves the value of invested earnings over time. People don’t usually place their
2 Elsewhere, alimony is used as a middle ground between work and property, but in Israel, the most a
divorcee can be compensated with for her marriage-related career loss is the value of that portion of her
marital property that represents her prior investment (Lifshitz 2009).
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earnings in stocks counting on predictable trajectories, but hoping that their value will
rise and knowing that it may fall. This has little to do with how Israelis, who are
generally risk-averse, prefer to handle their household property. Rather, their
resources are unwittingly placed at risk for them by an economic policy that embraces
global market exposure (Dahan 2011). If anything, they acquire property to shield
against such uncertainties. It’s becoming harder for them to plan their futures through
property, seeing as markets transform it into a stock-like entity whose prospects for
appreciation correlate less with their preserved work earnings than with the risks
they’ve been made to undertake. The accountant’s statements reproduce a public
discourse in which people’s motivations are strategically and erroneously framed in
terms of the very behaviors expected of them, namely those of the risk-taking investors
that, as will become clearer in the next section, they are certainly not.
The realities of financialization are making inroads into legal reasoning, as in the
following. A woman asked to be exempted from her ex-husband’s debt, which he
had incurred by speculating on currency exchanges. Divorce law considers debt a
negative return on investment, thereby divisible marital property like any other; yet
it charges that gambling debt be borne by the gambler alone. The judge rejected the
woman’s request to treat her ex’s speculations as gambling debt, framing them
instead as investments pure and simple. He referred to the recent financial crisis,
wherein people lost their savings and pensions, as the situation in which we all live
today. So long as investments are legally and financially sound, he said, their
outcomes should be treated like any other property (FC (Krayot) 11495-11-08). So
even in the context of volatility and with regard to practices oriented to short-term
and unforeseeable gains and losses rather than a long-term storing of value, courts
perceive their outcomes from the standpoint of economic liberalism’s notion of
property: as delayed returns on marital investments whose division should settle
accounts between divorcing spouses (Dagan 2005).3
As in most liberal democracies, Israeli courts prioritize contribution to the value
of property over considerations like a divorcing spouse’s need (Lifshiz 2004;
Reynolds 1988). But the less property satisfies need on account of its insufficient or
unstable value, the more courts struggle to accommodate need over and against their
proclivity to conclude divorces by dividing property equally as if its value were a
moot point (Lifshitz 2001). Family courts contend with fortunes skewed by
unforeseeably profitable or costly property, and most court cases I’ve looked at
involved some use or another of legal discretion to even out fortunes of couples
skewed by legal property divisions guided by liberal notions of the self-evident
value of ownership or of property conceived of as an investment vehicle.4 These
notions are part of a market-friendly legal and economic apparatus encouraging
3 Chanoch Dagan offers an alternative approach to property, whereby property institutions serve, and
property laws enforce ideals and values. Thus, division of marital property should be guided by desire to
preserve modern marriage as an egalitarian liberal community (Dagan 2003, 2005; Dagan and Frantz
2004).
4 Contract law provides further evidence for the ideology that courts are guided by. In the past, contracts
could be overturned if due to unforeseen circumstances they resulted in unfair gains or losses. Since the
nineteenth century, courts have been upholding such contracts under the understanding that legal subjects
are speculators undertaking risks with reasonable foresight (O’Malley 2006).
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investment, whose viability for working households relies on institutional protec-
tions and market predictability that no longer pertain. Only on a case-to-case basis
do judges attend to discrepancies that result from this conception of property.
Foregrounding value is the first step in making sense of these discrepancies rather
than brushing them off.
Practical strategies
To speak of property is to speak of ownership, or, control over an object. It’s a
discursive truism that plays out in divorce proceedings, which are all about who gets
what. Ownership looms large in economic and legal institutions as well, which
sensitize people to their own possessions while obscuring broader patterns in the
structure of distribution (Ryan 1984: 115). Prioritizing ownership deflects from
questions of value. The oversight rankles when property values fluctuate enough to
turn a household’s privately owned and potentially valuable homes, savings
accounts, insurance contracts or pensions into deadweights or liabilities. Yet
members of households are not so easily fooled. In out-of-court divorce settlements
they demonstrate that for them, value is paramount. Contrary to what liberal ideas
suggest, though, it’s not the future promise of investment value that guides their
practical strategies but the value of their security here and now.
Most married households treat their resources as shared (Joseph and Rowlingson
2012) such that ownership only becomes an issue upon divorce. Even then, it is
security rather than ownership that guides negotiations. I’ve seen divorced men and
women exhibit great generosity toward their ex-spouses only if they have enough
themselves to live on. I’ve also seen them embark on long vengeful legal battles
against their exes only if they have the wherewithal to do so. I spoke to one woman
who owned a small apartment with her husband of 18 years. They had recently
bought a private suburban home to accommodate their teenage children, investing
all of their savings in it and taking a mortgage loan for the rest. They couldn’t reach
a divorce settlement because neither had the money to buy off the other’s share of
the home. Real-estate prices in this suburb were skyrocketing. If nothing else, I
suggested, the home would be a great investment. She agreed, but insisted that she
hadn’t the money to pay for it, nor would she qualify for a loan that would help her.
Why not simply sell it, then, split the money and be done with it? Because they’d be
losing too much, she explained: adding up taxes, repo bills, mortgage termination
fines, legal fees and payment to realtors, the entire value of the home would be lost,
leaving nothing for their children. She and her husband were eager to get on with
their separate lives, but recoiled from the prohibitive cost of their freedom.
The liberal clean break that guides divorce legislation is an expensive luxury. So
is the break down the middle of formal property divisions. Dividing a home, a
savings or a pension account by turning them into cash for further investment often
means losing more than divorcing couples can afford to. These couples don’t
generally aspire to recoup and reinvest the value they’d put into these things. On the
contrary, they often come up with rather costly solutions in terms of investment
potential and fall back on existing resources rather than investing strategically in
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more. Having little leverage, they prioritize landing on their feet to having a spry
springboard from which to leap back into the economic race.
Specifically, divorcing spouses might leave pensions intact and divert portions of
their retirement incomes to their ex-spouses only when they mature. They might
leave homes intact so that the custodial parent can remain there with the children. If
a woman can’t afford to buy off her ex-husband’s share, she might discount it from
the monthly child-support payments he owes her. When neither spouse can afford
their full share, it might be put in the children’s name. Other solutions I’ve
witnessed include one divorcing couple that had taken out a joint mortgage to keep
their second apartment, using it to finance the rent of the husband who’d moved out
of the family home. In another case, a woman forfeited her share of her husband’s
stocks, potentially of great value, in return for the family home and decent child
support. In yet another, a man took upon himself the entire marital debt so as to
protect his retirement savings, estimated at a lower value.
I spoke to a woman emerging out of a 13-year marriage. During the marriage,
she’d put her career as a therapist on hold to bring up her children, so her income
remained small. Her husband’s income wasn’t much higher, being a humanities
doctoral student and translating on the side. They were barely making it throughout
their marriage and divorce pushed them to the brink of disaster. They did partly own
their home thanks to her parents’ help with the down payment, but they were still
paying mortgage on it. She couldn’t afford to buy off her husband’s share, nor could
she afford the mortgage on her own. They agreed to sell their home, then, and give
her most of its value to buy a smaller apartment with. A split down the middle
would leave neither with enough to buy a new home and they wanted one for their
children. They also agreed that he pay less child support than the law specifies but
the most he could afford while pursuing a Ph.D. He promised to increase the sum
upon attaining a university position. Just as he’d started paying the agreed-upon
sum, his publisher went under. Her parents took over the child-support payments
while he went looking for a new job. Not only do these maneuverings stray from the
legalities of property division, they’re a far cry from the notion of property as an
investment vehicle. Couples like these care less about ownership or investment than
about how best to use what little they have to secure their families.5
Every lawyer and mediator I spoke with made this observation. Do you know
what the value of your property is, they’d ask, or your monthly expenses? Consider
the standard spreadsheet that divorcees are asked to fill out. Under household
property, they must list and add up the value of net earnings from work, welfare
benefits, savings accounts, stocks and bonds, real estate, business incomes,
pensions, insurances, royalties, tax returns, vehicles, furniture, as well as credit
card debt, tax debt, personal loan debt, mortgage debt and so on. Under regular
household expenses, they must list and add up the value of rent, city and other taxes,
utility bills, communication and media bills, home and car maintenance, various
insurance payments, household services, food, cleaning and clothing expenses,
5 Studying smallholders of rural Columbia, Gudeman and Rivera (1990) similarly note their preference
for durable goods that might ensure the continuity of their households over time, to profitable investment
opportunities promoted by the corporate world.
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education, entertainment, and medical expenses, vacation and recreational expenses,
expenses related to birthdays, holidays, charity and so on. These values are at most
implicit in most households’ daily conduct. They only enter their consciousness
once security is at stake.
Divorcees undertake these calculations not to figure out their investment
equivalents or potentials but to make sure they can get by. Jurisprudence conceives
of household property as a repository of prior marital investments, but when I asked
divorcees about their specific contributions to their marital property, they let me
understand that this was beside the point. Even those who acknowledged having
made larger contributions than their spouses shrugged it off. At issue for them was
only the value of their property in terms of the security they sought. It had little to
do with what they’d invested in it or what its liquidation value might be. They
sensed, moreover, that security costs more than expected returns on their
investments, and they pursued it by other means. This was most evident in work.
Many relinquished higher paying jobs for those that allowed them to make ends
meet. ‘‘I have a pension plan now and a decent insurance,’’ a divorcee who’d made
such a trade-off explained: ‘‘That’s how I take responsibility for my future.’’ Nor
was work necessarily intensified. Without a spouse to pick up the slack in
childrearing, many divorced mothers started working shorter hours to be home with
their children, just as divorced fathers stopped working overtime when obliged to
spend scheduled afternoons and weekends with them.
A chief non-investment means of security was child support. ‘‘No parent ever
calculates before having children how much they would cost them by the time
they’re eighteen,’’ a family court judge told me: ‘‘and yet they wage wars over every
penny of child support as if their future depended on it.’’ Almost everyone I asked
about their divorce had fairly little to say about property compared to how much
they talked about child support. Mothers fretted over child support being too low to
meet their needs, while fathers complained about how much of their earnings were
turned over to their ex-wives.6 It was so contentious precisely because of the
precarity of both work and property values. Child support represents a steady
monthly income over as many years as it takes the youngest child to reach legal
maturity. For mothers, it offers a more suitable buffer against the precarity of work
than property does, while for fathers it’s a more burdensome obligation. One
divorced mother was perfectly willing to cede over half the marital property but
wouldn’t budge on child support. Her ex-husband countered that her business brings
in far more than his monthly salary. True, she said, but anything could happen to a
business: child support was her only security.
Divorcees sought other transfers to weather the financial strain. If eligible for
welfare benefits, they claimed them with fewer misgivings than they might have had
when married. This lowering of inhibitions applied more forcibly to their demands
of their parents or extended families. Divorce law, oriented to the liberal model of
property as private property, leaves extended families out of settlements. But almost
6 In Israel, fathers are usually the ones paying child support to mothers. Israel’s custody and child-
support laws presuppose traditional gender roles in childrearing, lagging behind its more pluralistic social
trends (Hacker 2008).
Contesting the value of household property 297
123
every divorcee I spoke with considered them as huge factors in their financial
dealings. Their parents gave them money, offered them a place to live, watched over
the grandchildren. Some would not have been able to afford divorce at all were it
not for this help. They also eyed the extended family resources at the disposal of
their spouse when negotiating divorce settlements. Arguments over what each
spouse gives or takes frequently turned to what each spouse’s parents could
contribute.
Liberal economic models are commonly constructed around the figure of the
individual wage earner, proprietor, and consumer. Property as target and trigger for
investment makes most sense for an isolated individual with little recourse other
than property to secure her future against interruptions to her work income.
Yet almost everywhere, people participate in the economy not as individuals but as
resource-pooling households, integrated in larger social and political networks.
Recently, economists and anthropologists have taken households as their units of
analysis, but they have done so halfheartedly, given differences in goals and
influence among its members (Chibnik 2011). Intra-household tensions notwith-
standing, income pressures are imposed on households as if they were unified
entities. Against them, households have historically displayed far more flexibility
than an isolated consumer, wage earner or proprietor might (Smith and Wallerstein
2000).
Among those who can’t rely on the value of their property, solutions to the
economic setback of divorce run the gamut from cutting back on consumption to
filling more of the domestic duties themselves, sacrificing promising careers for
more secure employment, soliciting money or domestic services from parents,
cashing in on social security and demanding child-support from ex-spouses.
Property ownership is not their primary fallback, nor do they necessarily regard it in
terms of past or future investment value. They strategize, in other words, not as
maximizing individuals responding to investment incentives, but as security-seeking
households with pressing immediate concerns who’d just as readily extract what
they can from already-available resources. To the extent that the unpredictability of
property values is responsible for this, financialization has at least one unintended
consequence: highlighting the tensions between liberal notions of private property
as an investment vehicle that promotes the productivity of society and the correlate
prosperity of its members; and the actual role property plays in the well-being of
households.
Accumulation
To understand what’s at stake in these tensions, we need to turn our gaze to liberalism’s
capitalist foundations. Briefly, a capitalist system is based on the production of goods
and services for profit. There must be a surplus from which this profit can be procured.
For surplus to be accumulated, workers have to sacrifice some of the value of their
work investments. They could be forced to do so by the removal of other sources of
subsistence, and they can be encouraged to do so through such incentives as the right to
own property. Liberal economic thinkers have ignored the former and emphasized the
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latter: promoting property rights as a way of maximizing efficiency in the use of
available resources and thus leading to individual well-being and social wealth. People
are invited to store some of their earnings in savings accounts, homes, or other forms of
durable property, counting on their ability to retrieve their value sometime in the
future. They contribute to accumulation by working harder to afford property. The less
secure they feel, the greater property’s appeal as something to fall back on. As property
becomes more obtainable through loans and installment plans, larger portions of the
population invest in.
Still, capitalism’s proponents and opponents alike (for example Harvey
2006, 2013; Knight 1921) consider property a mixed blessing for accumulation:
an investment incentive, to be sure, but also a monopolistic tool that undermines
productive competition, and a hoard of resources that could otherwise be reinvested
in production. This worry goes as far back as Puritan Richard Baxter, whose
writings Max Weber famously drew on to describe the spirit of capitalism,
preaching against ‘‘the security of possession’’ as ultimately relaxing the impulse to
invest productively (Weber 2004:104). The institution of private property allows too
much value to be ferreted away rather than being fed back into an active economy.
A financialized regime of accumulation, as introduced in recent decades in Israel and
other advanced economies, goes a long way in tackling this problem. Financial markets
feed on a steady inflow of capital. One of its main sources is household property that’s a
composite of regular mortgage payments, pension and other long-term savings,
insurance contracts, and a variety of consumer debt payments. They flow directly, or
through institutional intermediaries, into the global market, where they turn into credit
for leveraging a range of diversified investments. Their returns depend on the
profitability of various economic enterprises. Pension savings, for example, are invested
over decades in stocks and bonds, while the value of homes is finally determined only
after twenty-odd years of interest-rate-sensitive mortgage repayments.
In Israel, as in many other advanced economies, a couple of decades of
privatizations and cutbacks on state spending have removed the safety nets that
people have long relied on for their security. In response, people have been turning
to financial instruments to help them attain the privately owned assets that hold forth
a promise of security by providing sources of income unrelated to the steadiness of,
or interruptions to, work earnings. Financialization has also brought about the
fabrication of new kinds of property, which became collateral for more investment
(Grey 1980; Leyshon and Thrift 2007). But just as property proliferates, it ceases to
preserve the value of prior investments for future use. Instead, it channels
investments from working households to global markets and is revalued daily
according to these markets’ success (Martin 2002). Financialization engenders,
therefore, a new kind of ownership society, designed to make everyone rely for their
security on financial markets, which manage their savings and investments
(Soederberg 2007). The advantage to accumulation is plain. No one can feel so
secure in the stored value of his or her earnings to cease investing, and earnings are
pooled in the global market for reinvestment in economic accumulation on a grand
scale. The linkage of property values to global finance thereby aligns the interests of
working and property-owning households with the process of accumulation
(Sotiropoulos et al. 2013).
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Anthropology calls into question the liberal ideology of private ownership when
it looks to social and political relations for insight into the nature of property and its
significance (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006; Hann 1993, 2007, 2015; Verdery
2003). It can offer a biting critique of economic liberalism by exposing the
contradictions that inhere in a liberal idea of property as an investment vehicle.
Taking a value-theoretical approach, Graeber (2001) has drawn on Nancy Munn
(1986) and Terence Turner (1979) to argue that actions and ideas become embodied
in value forms, which then proceed to activate further actions. I take this to mean
that a value form like property, far from being a self-evident investment vehicle, has
to be understood in the context of the actions and ideas that endow it with value, as
well as the actions that its value brings about.
Harvey (2006) adds specificity by depicting these actions and ideas as designed
to promote accumulation processes, and by pointing out that the forms in which
they’re embodied come into contradiction with the needs and desires of those who
use them. Such tensions pave the path to criticizing an ideology so prevalent in both
public discourse and jurisdiction that it continues to hold sway, even as its
conditions of possibility no longer pertain. This is the case with the liberal idea of
property as an investment vehicle in the era of financialization. The unreliability of
property values undermines the appeal of property as a mutually advantageous
conduit of value between working households and accumulation. Deprived of public
safety nets, working households are pushed to invest in property. But its
unreliability also makes them seek other solutions for their insecurity.
Property’s shortcomings are magnified in divorce, seeing as separating households
are even more concerned about security than intact households. While this has
arguably always been the case, the conditions under which they seek this security in
Israel, as in other financialized economies, are changing. Just as household property is
promoted as a source of security in the face of diminishing public protections, it
becomes far less reliable in filling this role. Consequently, tensions arise between its
division and the goals that divorcees pursue with or without it. Jurisprudence follows a
liberal logic in equating household property with marital investments and concluding
divorces with its equal division. Specific about the present moment is the extent to
which divided property fails to secure or even out the fortunes of divorcing spouses.
Increasingly, then, courts are pushed to restore the balance ad hoc.
In out-of-court settlements, divorcees do not trace the overall value of their
property back to their prior investments, nor do they try to determine its liquidation
value or maximize its future potential. Rather, they creatively manipulate of their
property to satisfy their current needs. They seek steady rather than investment-
heavy incomes, and make do with less. They fall back on already-existing resources
such as transfers from state and relatives. They claim regular portions of their
spouses’ earnings in the form of child support, or pool incomes in creative ways
with ex-spouses or extended families. Their strategies defy the logic of ownership
and investment as the self-evident path to productivity and prosperity.
Divorce highlights the challenges that financialization poses to the liberal logic of
investment. Where economic liberalism focuses on the profit-maximizing individ-
ual, divorcees are members of households individualized by necessity, and they
brace against the affects of this individualization not in a maximizing spirit but in a
300 H. Weiss
123
quest for security. Where the liberal ideology of property is neutral about the
material forms it takes on, prioritizing its function as an investment vehicle without
further ado, divorcing couples often resist the liquidation and division of durable
household property upon which they rely for their security. And where a liberal
identification of property with investment projects predictable outcomes onto a
fairly predictable future, divorce is a moment of rupture, mostly unexpected, which
intensifies the exigencies of the here and now.
In recent decades, more and more households have been propelled by insecurity
and encouraged by credit and other financial instruments to invest in property. Yet
the unstable value of property also triggers a countertendency to seek security
elsewhere. It deepens the fault lines of a regime of accumulation that uses property
to encourage the active contributions by working households. The liberal virtues of
property as an engine of growth should be qualified when markets are volatile and
values are in flux. Far from being motivated to invest ever more vigorously,
households sometimes choose to disinvest. Divorcees, especially, are prone to
falling back on already-existing non-property resources that they do not privately
own. My point of departure was Piketty traveling back in time through Jane Austin’s
marriage-obsessed heroines in order to foreshadow the significance of property in
the twenty-first century. My ethnography suggests that contrary to the continuity
that Piketty posits, if nowadays Lizzy were to divorce Mr. Darcy, all of his property
notwithstanding, she would still hit him up for child support.
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